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Introduction
If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise.—Blake, The
Marriage ofHeaven and Hell
explores the changing relation between desire and
value, as they affect the protagonists' identity, in English novels
between 1850 and 1928.1 examine the imaginative predilections
of two mid-Victorians, two late-Victorians, and two Modernists.
Each chapter seeks to identify the novelist's characteristic stance
toward desire by interrogating in detail a pair of his novels.1 The
study moves from narratives of repression and disguise in Dickens and Eliot to narratives of release and celebration in Lawrence
and Joyce.
Seen synoptically, my book inquires into the novelistic
imagination of freedom. It does so by examining a range of protagonists' capacities to accommodate and turn to creative personal use the givens of nature and culture. To be in a body is to
experience desire and to be inscribed in the natural world of
space and time. To have a mind is to inherit attitudes toward
desire because one is inscribed in the cultural world of sanctions
and prohibitions. Since no one creates either his body or his
mind, all embodied thinking subjects—all protagonists—achieve
their freedom in the measure that they come to terms with these
matrical systems of nature and culture.2
T H I S STUDY

1

My discussion of Joyce centers on the major novel, Ulysses.
1 realize that there are other and more spectacular forms of freedom,
especially those that involve a risk of one's being in behalf of a chosen ideal. This
is the domain of heroism proper. I have chosen to focus on a more obscure
(though omnipresent) realm of freedom, that involved in a subject's relation to
his inalienable given conditions.
2

3
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Allegiance to nature and culture is involuntary. The character of the allegiance alters, however, and that alteration is the
subject of my book. At its most schematic, the argument goes
like this: the mid-Victorians privilege culture; they imagine the
protagonist becoming himself—achieving freedom—by subordinating the givens of his natural body. The Modernists, by contrast, privilege nature; they envisage the protagonist's freedom
and self-enactment in his capacity to affirm desire and to resist,
ignore, or simply endure his culture's injunctions. Freedom is
possible in both of these positions. For the novelists who come
between mid-Victorian and Modern, however—for Hardy and
Conrad—neither culture nor nature is privileged. Both systems
are in limbo. The cultural scripts within the protagonist have lost
their force but may not be discarded, while his natural propensities wreak havoc with his goals but may not be sanctioned. Hardy
and Contrad cannot imagine self-discovery in terms other than
self-rupture. Split between nature and culture, their protagonists
rarely achieve identity or freedom.
This development has considerable formal consequences. We
begin with the mid-Victorian plot of a cohesive protagonist
moving through public space and time and, eventually, either
achieving the social career that he has personally willed or failing
(for carefully documented reasons) to do so. This is the plot of
Dickens and Eliot in which an unruly self grows up. His freedom
is enacted as his capacity to realize—through his will—the prescriptions of his culture: as Freud would say, to live up to the
requirements of his superego. The late-Victorian plot of Hardy
and Conrad characteristically accepts these societal terms but cannot make good on them. Tess and Jude, Jim and Nostromo,
want to love, work, and succeed exactly as their culture prescribes, but the prescription is becoming chimera-like, beckoning
yet unrealizable. Something at the core of the protagonist insists
on or cannot evade the sabotage of aspirations.
The novels of Lawrence and Joyce exploit this element of
sabotage. Their early Bildungsromane elaborate the acculturation
plot in all of its impossibility. Neither writer can imagine the
subjective experience of freedom in its terms. Lawrence and Joyce
both conceive a protagonistic self in opposition to this model, a
4
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self that is not performed through the exercise of will, and not
interested in a career defined by lengthy apprenticeship to and
eventual mastery over culturally approved forms of work. Their
great novels formally abandon or parody the plot of social integration. Lawrence imagines identity and freedom elsewhere; Joyce
(in Ulysses) reconceives them here, within culture, but in terms
that would perplex or scandalize his Victorian predecessors.
I shall argue in Part One that in the fiction of Dickens and
Eliot the subject is conceived as transcendentally pure, established prior to cultural or natural constraints. Unlike the rebellious Romantic version of this subject, the transcendental Victorian subject chooses acculturation; he joins up. This orderly
conception is of course disseminated by Victorian society; it is
one of its foremost conventions. Thoughts and behavior that
continue to transgress this normative convention may not be
sanctioned in the protagonist; his career unfolds in the form of
his gradual, often painful, assimilation of this norm.
Such a career may exact a considerable price, for it insists
on a subject fully capable of altruism, discipline, and earnestness:
a subject who subordinates his own concerns to those of others,
who controls his body's impulses, and whose consciousness is
capable of self-knowledge. My study begins at those moments
when this subject starts to become unimaginable. That is, those
occasions on which Dickens and Eliot are unable to imagine the
protagonist fulfilling his prescription because other elements, just
glimpsed in the self but somehow exigent, seem to require another denouement. In Dickens and Eliot these are only occasions
because their imaginations are usually on good terms with their
culture's protagonistic norm. Indeed, they never knowingly violate this norm. The panorama of characters unlike the protagonist usually permits the lateral siphoning off of illicit energies. At
times, however, something does go wrong. The writer's imagination, uncoercible, shows signs of apostasy. It apprehends as
subjectively desirable a course of actions or cluster of feelings
that the dictates of conscience must abjure.
In Hardy and Conrad the cultural allegiances that make up
conscience remain in place, but the writer's immediate apprehension of his subject's thoughts, desires, and probable behavior has
5
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become further thwarted. He cannot imagine the free development of a protagonist in terms that intersect his culture's norms,
and he cannot endorse a development that violates those norms.
I think of these novels as "tragic encounters" because the incarnate subject is embarked, increasingly, on a career conceived in
terms that ensure disaster. His culturally enjoined identity—the
sanctions by which he recognizes, orients, and evaluates himself—is losing its purchase on the immediate data of thought and
feeling. He finds himself experiencing what he is incapable of
accommodating; his culture has led him to propose for himself
projects which he has no means of achieving. The scripts of legibility through which the culture licenses its models of identity
are becoming for him inapplicable, but he will cancel himself
through suicide rather than repudiate those scripts. His creator
can imagine no exit from this dilemma.
Lawrence and Joyce begin to demythologize these scripts.
Both writers overtly recognize (rather than merely imply) the
injurious effects of culturally licensed norms of identity, aspiration, and career. The subject can be imagined as free again, because the relation between the subject and the myriad elements
that compose and constrain it has been reconceived. The self no
longer yearns to be transcendentally prior to the natural world
(its incarnate grounding, the locus of its desires and actual possibilities), nor does it seek a perfect fusion with the cultural world
(its ideological grounding, its human inheritance). The narratives
that contain these newly conceived subjects are likewise redesigned to accommodate their newfound freedom. No plots of
societal career that presuppose shared societal norms, likewise no
plots of achieved escape that pre-suppose a transcendental self
free of societal traces: in fact, little plot at all, for the freedom of
these embodied subjects is largely constituted by their momentby-moment movement in time, essaying (sometimes whimsically,
sometimes ecstatically) their conditional possibilities.

S U C H , in summary form, is the argument of this book. I need
now (at the risk of re-inventing the wheel) to identify the literary
and philosophical premises that have made the argument possi-

6
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ble. These premises, everywhere operative though often unstated, cluster about the following terms: freedom, protagonist,
plot, subject, self and society, transcendental and contingent,
identity, and (above all) imagination.
The question of freedom provides the rationale for this study's
focus upon the career of the central figure(s), the protagonist(s),
as well as for its considerable attention to the shape of plots. The
protagonist is the character through whom the creative writer
tends to imagine most intimately the experience of freedom. It
is true, of course, that novelists project their sense of inner possibility into the whole of their created canvas—its range of characters, its cluster of plots, its typical movement, its setting, its
syntax. But preeminendy they convey their own subjective reality
(what it feels like to be alive, responsive, and desiring in a world
of others) through the creation of protagonists.
Protagonists enact, however, a dual allegiance. If they house
their creator's psychic investment, they also testify to the normative stresses of the society within which their creator moves.
This crossing of subjective energy and societal constraint defines,
for my study, their peculiar interest. Becky Sharpe, for example,
accommodates her creator's shrewdest sense of reality, but
Thackeray has not treated her as a protagonist: he has not sought
to align her energies within the web of her society's norms. Indeed, she may be defined as the power of illicit energies on the
other side of the norms. In the Victorian novel the protagonists
must move, in good faith, in the daylight of their culture's sanctions, however shaped they may be, simultaneously, by the nocturnal energies of their creator's imagination. (This tension between sanctioned forms of expression and wayward energies
seeking release is the recurrent focus of Parts One and Two of
this study. In Part Three the tension alters, as the Modernists
call into question the sanctioning process itself.)
The range of movements that these protagonists desire to
make exists in a dialectic relation to the movements that they are
actually empowered to make. The shape of this dialectic is the
plot. To discuss the plot is to register the variety of non-subjective elements that affect the career of the protagonists: their capacity for freedom.
7
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Paradoxically, this opposition—protagonist versus society—
is at the same time an equation: protagonist-and-society. The self
that desires and the society that restrains are interpenetrative terms.
The romantic opposition of self (unscripted, pure) versus society
(scripted, maculate, corrupting) is, on scrutiny, untenable—untenable because it assumes that self is transcendentally prior to
society. If we reject this metaphysical assumption, we must conclude that "self' and "society" answer to opposed optics on a
common spectrum of phenomena, for how could self be constituted if not from the materials—family, school, church, law, customs, etc.—of society? And how could society be conceived apart
from its status as a historically descended commonwealth of selves?
The materials are common but the optics are opposed. This
simple point has considerable implications. Self can neither vanquish society nor be merged into it: their difference is as inextinguishable as it is incomplete. An entity located in society, in every
respect composed of elements common to society, self is nevertheless not society. Or, to put it more precisely, self refers to no
entity at all—for entity implies object—but rather to the characteristic mode of relations that an individual as subject sustains
with himself and with the social world in which he lives.
For the writer as writer, that mode of subjective relation is
imaginative: we arrive thus at one of the governing concepts of
this study, imagination. Imagination is the writer's preeminent
faculty, a power of perception that has no transcendental status,
is at all times conditioned, but is nevertheless unpredictable. It
carries the writer's identity for, unlike his conscience, it is not
the property of his culture's norms. Not that it is exclusively his
own property either, to be shaped at will. "Perception is not
whimsical but fatal," says Emerson, and imagination is that ineluctable manner of seeing things that marks the writer's ineluctable identity (156). Operative within consciousness but not coequal with it, shaped through the pressure of conscience by cultural
sanctions but equally a mode of responding to and deploying
those sanctions, gradually and unconsciously formed over the years,
a writer's imagination is his signature. It expresses (with whatever internal fissures) his inclusive way of reading his world.3
3

For a shrewd discussion of how a writer's conflicted psychology creates
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The point is important because it carries the issue of the
writer's freedom (and by extension that of his characters). To be
conditioned is not to be unfree; to be shaped by societal paradigms is not to be deprived of self. Self is authenticated through
the deployment of materials not self-originated. The presence of
ineradicable societal traces within a writer's imagination only means
that his freedom is constituted by his relation to those traces: by
what he does with and through them. The evolving dialectic
between a writer's imagination and his given conditions (both
inner and outer)—a dialectic as unpredictable as it is unrepeatable—finally if his creative freedom. Meditating on this dialectic,
Proust states the case succincdy:
Moreover this reaction of locally procured materials on
the genius who utilises them and to whose work their reaction imparts an added freshness, does not make the work
any less individual, and whether it be that of an architect, a
cabinet-maker or a composer, it reflects no less minutely the
most subtle shades of the artist's personality, because he has
been compelled to work in the millstone of Senlis or the red
sandstone of Strasbourg, has respected the knots peculiar to
the ash-tree, has borne in mind, when writing his score, the
resources, the limitations, the volume of sound, the possibilities of a flute or alto voice. (1:682)
The authority of individual achievement (and thereby the
creator's identity) depends not on the myth of a transcendental
subject working within the vacuum of its self-chosen terms and
instruments. Rather, Proust indicates, it emerges through the
performance of a contingent subject operating under the pressure
of innumerable restrictions, and actualizing himself through those
restrictions. Such a performative model of identity accommofissures within the writing itself, see the essays Frederick Crews has collected in
Out of My System. Crews candidly discusses the appeal and the pitfalls of a psychoanalytic approach to literature. See also Julia Kristeva's Desire in Language: A
Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Kristeva locates the problematics of language in both the artifice of the sign and instinctual drives that skew any straightforward communication of meaning. Mikhail Bakhtin very suggestively reads
Dostoevsky's entire corpus as an interplay of conflicting subjective voices, none
subordinated to a single commanding design.
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dates both authors and their protagonists; it underlies in a number of ways the argument of this book.
With respect to authors, the model suggests that their power
is inseparable from their receptivity—to the bias of their imagination, to the exigencies of their medium, to the constraints of
their culture. The writer's imagination, even as it eludes his wouldbe-sovereign will, records the stresses of his situation. He may
truck with his imagination, abuse it, exploit it, but he cannot
commandeer its testimony. (The latent quarrel within this faculty
between the press of nature and the restraint of culture [between
the unconscious and the superego] animates my chapters on
Dickens and Eliot. This same quarrel, become overt, animates
my chapters on Hardy and Conrad. The attempt to heal the quarrel
animates my chapter on Lawrence and Joyce.)
Insofar as the Proustean model accommodates protagonists,
it focuses attention less on their intrinsic properties than on their
mode of relations with the world they inhabit. Freedom and
identity emerge in the subject's transactions, in his capacity, not
to create new conditions, but to realize himself by accepting and
energizing his given conditions. Throughout, of course, these
given conditions are nature and culture, bodily desire and societal constraint. They have been addressed first in terms of my
book's argument, next in terms of its premises. They may now
be approached in terms of its methodology.

of desire: my title comes from Paul Ricoeur.
In the opening pages of his study of Freud, Ricoeur speaks of
"the semantics of desire, a semantics that centers around a somewhat nuclear theme: as a man of desires I go forth in disguise—
larvatus prodeo" (6-7). A man of desires is opaque—to himself,
to others. To be understood, he must be subjected to a hermeneutical scrutiny that will unravel his utterance by locating the
kernel of unacknowledged desire that is serving as its orientation.
Ricoeur goes on to identify Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the
three master critics of a school of suspicion that specializes in the
art of unmasking. In their work the testimony of subjective consciousness becomes systematically suspect, for consciousness is
T H E SEMANTICS

10
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everywhere blind to its own strategic biases. Conditioned by an
economic system that dictates his ideology, a libidinal system
that controls his erotic choices, and a will to power that predisposes him to the exploitation of others, the mystified subject
nevertheless manages to think of himself as transcendentally free,
guileless, and self-knowing. "Beginning with [Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud]," Ricoeur writes, "understanding is hermeneutics:
henceforward, to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to decipher its expressions" (33).
In order to assess properly the subject's hidden conditionality, this study will supplement its literary analysis by drawing
(especially in the chapter on Dickens) on Nietzsche and Freud.
Both thinkers subvert a nineteenth-century model of the subject
as innocent and autonomous. Nietzehe seeks to dislodge this model
of the subject by exposing the concealed presence of an amoral
will to power within its discourse and behavior, while Freud's
hermeneutic charts the disowned movement of unresolved (and
likewise amoral) sexual energies within the same discourse and
behavior. For both thinkers, the subject is essentially unaware of
his own motives.
A critical methodology rigidly shaped to the contours of the
Freud-Nietzsche model has, however, its limitations. Put simply,
such a model is too suspicious; it assumes, programmatically,
that consciousness is opaque to all of the subject's deeper intentions. The point is important because Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud—in their common premise of a mystified subject—have
served as a point de repere for recent interpretive theory. The shared
premise is that an initiated observer with a privileged hermeneutical lens can identify those ideological crossings that the author himself has absorbed but not understood, and which have
actively produced his text.4 Terry Eagleton writes:
4
The contemporary makers of this argument are legion. For an excellent
overview, see Josue V. Harari's "Critical Factions/Critical Fictions." A handful
of representative works that explore or expound this premise include Jonathan
Culler's Structuralist Poetics, Paul de Man's Blindness and Insight, Terry Eagleton's
Criticism and Ideology, Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses and L'ordre du discours, Frank Lentricchia's After the New Criticism, and Edward Said's Beginnings.
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Criticism is not a passage from text to reader: its task is not
to redouble the text's self-understanding, to collude with its
object in a conspiracy of eloquence. Its task is to show the
text as it cannot know itself, to manifest those conditions of
its making (inscribed in its very letter) about which it is
necessarily silent. It is not just that the text knows some
things and not others; it is rather that its very self-knowledge is the construction of a self-oblivion. (43)
To an extent I have followed this shrewd (and in its way
irresistible) advice: the author begets but does not own his text.
Ineradicably stained by ideology himself, how could he fail to
produce a text that says more and other things than it knows
itself saying? The critic's job is not to cooperate with the text but
to expose it. Explain, don't interpret: so runs the current axiom.
The stance is deliberately neutral if not hostile. The text must be
approached from a standpoint as insistently external to the text's
own self-understanding as possible. This argument is buttressed
by the sophisticated awareness that no text can be fully entered
on its own subjective terms anyway: and if the critic is irremediably outside, let him make a virtue of his foreignness.
At this point the price that a hermeneutics of suspicion pays
for its insight comes into view. The subject is transformed into
the object. Since it cannot be grasped in its self-understanding,
since, moreover, it has no access to its own deepest implications,
it must expressly undergo a tactics of alienation. It becomes, in
the current critical act, an entity foreign to itself and foreign to
its observer.5 Insofar as my deepest epistemological conviction is
that we understand only those human objects whose inner subjectivity we can imagine, I draw back from this model of the
alienated object. It needs to be counter-balanced by a model of
the coherent subject.
This counter-model is phenomenological in two respects. It
reads the work of art as expression, as a complex imaginative
5
Roland Bardies' S/Z, in its dismantling and reconstruction of an inconspicuous tale by Balzac, is probably the terminus ad quern of this methodological
model. Bardies' interest in the tale, and his capacity to find the tale interesting,
are remarkable. What is generally missing, however, is Balzac.
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gesture toward wholeness and self-discovery on the part of the
author who created the work. And it proposes, as the task of
criticism, the most intimate relation possible to the creative voice
at the heart of the work.6 This intimacy, like all intimacy, depends upon a critical surrender to the entity being approached.
My book seeks, therefore, to approach the self-understanding of
the novelistic universe in question, to identify its nodal and enabling assumptions, those creative premises that have generated
its characteristic shape and concerns and that intimate what can
and cannot be achieved within its contours. I do not claim to
have entered the subjective voice of each novelist, and it may be
that my attempt to approach that voice is, ultimately, indefensible (because, the Derridean argument runs, there is no voice to
be approached). In any event, I remain persuaded that the writer's imagination does shape such a voice, and that deliberately to
ignore it amounts to a denaturing of the object under scrutiny.
Edward Said discusses the issue of the writer's command
over his own meanings in terms of authority and molestation.
Authority refers to the related notions of begetting, continuing,
controlling, and possessing that are bound up in the master idea
of an empowering creative subject. Molestation refers to the ob6
Within the practice of literary criticism, phenomenology means, most
generally, those methodologies that seek to locate in a writer's work (indeed in
all his utterances) the hidden movement of his subjective consciousness in search
of its own wholeness. This search necessarily traverses the entire world of objects
within which the subject lives: for the riddle of subjective identity is inscribed
precisely in his manifold relations with the objective world. Practitioners I have
learned most from are Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre Richard, and (in their earlier
work) Leo Bersani, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller. See Georges Poulet,
Studies in Human Time, The Interior Distance, The Metamorphoses of the Circle;
Jean-Pierre Richard, Litterature et sensation; Leo Bersani, Marcel Proust: The Fictions qfLft and Art; Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wordsworth's Poetry: 1787-1814; J. Hillis
Miller, Charles Dickens: The World of His Noveb; The Disappearance of God: Five
Nineteenth-Century Writers; Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers; and
Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire. Sarah Lawall discusses many of these critics
and their interpretive models in her Critics of Consciousness. As a philosophical
movement, Phenomenology derives from the work of Edmund Husserl. Nonspecialists will find a more accessible presentation of the major premises in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur (Le conflit des interpretations), and Vincent Descombes.
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stacles to authority, "a consciousness of one's duplicity, one's
confinement to a Active, scriptive realm, whether one is a character or a novelist" (84). The terms are necessarily dialectical, for
all non-transcendental authority emerges within the impersonal
and inhibiting conditions that make up molestation.
I have approached my six novelists as simultaneously instances of this dialectic and writers about it. Their sovereign control rewards a phenomenological movement of submission, even
as their failures of authority—their susceptibility to molestation—solicit a critical model of suspicion. Each chapter regulates
in its own fashion the ratio of trust to suspicion. Indeed, as each
fictional world is composed in its own distinctive terms, so the
approach varies to accommodate the specific tenor of those terms.
For example, the Dickens world invites sustained attention to a
wide range of relationships, all keyed to an ambiguous emotional
dynamic. By contrast, the Eliot, Hardy, and Conrad novels focus
more narrowly on protagonistic quests. Analysis of these latter
writers is therefore briefer and more strictly attentive to the reasons why such quests are ill-conceived or foredoomed. When I
reach Lawrence, I encounter a radically different kind of career
from any earlier examined; my chapter attends in detail to the
contours of that career in both his life and art. Career itself—the
idea of disciplined progress toward an established goal—becomes
a comic notion in Ulysses; thus that huge novel is approached not
as a field of developing life-histories, but rather as a resonant
universe, bristling at any given moment with its constituent patterns and discontinuities, but going nowhere.
The approach may vary, but, to use Lawrence's phrase, I
keep my eye on carbon. The focus in every chapter remains on
the identity-bearing encounter between desiring subject and restraining context. These discrete assessments are throughout related to the larger dimensions of the writer's enterprise, with
increasing emphasis upon relevant connections among the six
novelists. Yet this study's first allegiance is to the movement of
embodied protagonists through a single writer's landscape of inhibiting conditions. Each novelist imagines this movement in his
own way. I prefer to run the risk of an apparently uncentered
discourse rather than force each fictional world to fit the frame
14
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of a univocal vocabulary (mine) and to serve as objective in
stances that bear out an unvarying argument (also mine).
Nietzsche and Freud remain eminences grises in this book.
(Radical trust in the text's self-knowledge is as limiting a premise
as radical distrust.) The contexts of molestation they clarify are,
on the one hand, the imperious pressures of the body on thought
and behavior, and, on the other, the increasingly disabling char
acter of cultural scripts of identity and aspiration. As this study
reaches its third phase (the Modernists), many of these molesta
tions have themselves become auctorially assimilated. Lawrence
and Joyce endow their protagonists with an awareness of the
body's nature and the culture's artifice that had to enter my ear
lier writers' work either surreptitiously or with tragic conse
quences.
A more sustained focus on molestation would call even more
deeply into question the authority of the subject. (Desire itself
has its societal models,7 and there remain to be assessed those
cultural and economic factors discussed by the Marxists.) I con
tinue, however, to believe in a coherent subject (though neither
transcendentally posited nor perfectly self-knowing), and I con
tinue to believe it possible to approach the imaginative voice at
the center of that subject's discourse. Structuralists would remind
me that such approach can be conducted only through language
and is therefore a chimera: language being an empty system con
stituted by differences and therefore hostile to qualitative notions
of voice and identity. My provisional defense against this form
of molestation (and against others that would wholly unseat the
idea of authority) is to repeat a statement made earlier in this
introduction: to be conditioned is not to be unfree; to be shaped
by societal paradigms is not to be deprived of self. To the body
7

For the cultural inflection of desire, see Β,εηέ Girard, Deceit, Desire, and
the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Girard would reject my governing
assumptions since he sees desire as an entirely culture-determined phenomenon:
imitative, deceitful, and worthless. He assesses European novelists according to
the rigor with which, in his view, they expose and excoriate desire. I find his
book provocative, though it proceeds from assumptions and arrives at conclu
sions considerably opposed to my own.
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and mind that we have not created ourselves must be added the
language whose systemic organization is also not of our own
making. Yet our freedom, like our authority, consists exacdy in
what we achieve with and through our conditional body, mind,
and language.
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